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Abstract
Penetration Testing is a methodology for assessing network
security, by generating and executing possible hacking at-
tacks. Doing so automatically allows for regular and sys-
tematic testing. A key question is how to generate the at-
tacks. This is naturally formulated as planning under uncer-
tainty, i.e., under incomplete knowledge about the network
configuration. Previous work uses classical planning, and re-
quires costly pre-processes reducing this uncertainty by ex-
tensive application of scanning methods. By contrast, we
herein model the attack planning problem in terms of par-
tially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP). This
allows to reason about the knowledge available, and to in-
telligently employ scanning actions as part of the attack. As
one would expect, this accurate solution does not scale. We
devise a method that relies on POMDPs to find good attacks
on individual machines, which are then composed into an at-
tack on the network as a whole. This decomposition exploits
network structure to the extent possible, making targeted ap-
proximations (only) where needed. Evaluating this method
on a suitably adapted industrial test suite, we demonstrate its
effectiveness in both runtime and solution quality.
Introduction
Penetration Testing (short pentesting) is a methodology for
assessing network security, by generating and executing pos-
sible attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities of operating
systems and applications (e.g., (Arce and McGraw 2004)).
Doing so automatically allows for regular and systematic
testing without a prohibitive amount of human labor, and
makes pentesting more accessible to non-experts. A key
question is how to automatically generate the attacks.
A natural way to address this issue is as an attack plan-
ning problem. This is known in the AI Planning community
as the “Cyber Security” domain (Boddy et al. 2005). In-
dependently (though considerably later), the approach was
put forward also by Core Security (Lucangeli, Sarraute, and
Richarte 2010), a company from the pentesting industry. In
that form, attack planning is very technical, addressing the
low-level system configuration details that are relevant to
vulnerabilities. Herein, we are concerned exclusively with
this setting. We consider regular automatic pentesting as
done in Core Security’s “Core Insight Enterprise” tool. We
will use the term “attack planning” in that sense.
Lucangeli et al. (2010) encode attack planning into
PDDL, and use off-the-shelf planners. This already is
useful—in fact, it is currently employed commercially in
Core Insight Enterprise, using a variant of Metric-FF (Hoff-
mann 2003). However, the approach is limited by its inabil-
ity to handle uncertainty. The pentesting tool cannot be up-
to-date regarding all the details of the configuration of every
machine in the network, maintained by individual users.
Core Insight Enterprise currently addresses this by ex-
tensive use of scanning methods as a pre-process to plan-
ning, which then considers only exploits, i.e., hacking ac-
tions modifying the system state. The drawbacks of this
are that (a) this pre-process incurs significant costs in terms
of running time and network traffic, and (b) even so, since
scans are not perfect, a residual uncertainty remains (Metric-
FF is run based on the configuration that appears to be most
likely). Prior work (Sarraute, Richarte, and Lucangeli 2011)
has addressed (b) by associating each exploit with a suc-
cess probability. This is unable to model dependencies be-
tween the exploits, and it still requires extensive scanning (to
obtain realistic success probabilities) so does not solve (a).
Herein, we provide the first solution able to address both (a)
and (b), intelligently mixing scans with exploits like a real
hacker would. The basic insight is that penetration testing
can be naturally modeled in terms of solving a POMDP.
We encode the incomplete knowledge as an uncertainty
of state, thus modeling the possible network configurations
in terms of a probability distribution. Scans and exploits are
deterministic in that their outcome depends only on the state
they are executed in. Negative rewards encode the cost (the
duration) of scans and exploits; positive rewards encode the
value of targets attained. The model incorporates firewalls,
detrimental side-effects of exploits (crashing programs or
entire machines), and dependencies between exploits rely-
ing on similar vulnerabilities.
POMDP solvers fail to scale to large networks. This is not
surprising—even the input model grows exponentially in the
number of machines. We show how to address this based on
exploiting network structure. We view networks as graphs
whose vertices are fully-connected subnetworks, and whose
arcs encode the connections between these, filtered by fire-
walls. We decompose this graph into biconnected compo-
nents. We approximate the attacks on these components by
combining attacks on individual subnetworks. We approxi-
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mate the latter by combining attacks on individual machines.
The approximations are conservative, i.e., they never over-
estimate the value of the policy returned. Attacks on indi-
vidual machines are modeled and solved as POMDPs, and
the solutions are propagated back up. We evaluate this ap-
proach based on the test suite of Core Insight Enterprise,
showing that, compared to a global POMDP model, it vastly
improves runtime at a small cost in attack quality.
We next discuss some preliminaries. We then describe
our POMDP model, our decomposition algorithm, and our
experimental findings, before concluding the paper.
Preliminaries
We fill in some details on network structure and penetration
testing. We give a brief background on POMDPs.
Network Structure
Networks can be viewed as directed graphs whose vertices
are given by the setM of machines, and whose arcs are con-
nections between pairs of m ∈ M . However, in practice,
these network graphs have a particular structure. They tend
to consist of subnetworks, i.e., clustersN of machines where
every m ∈ N is directly connected to every m′ ∈ N . By
contrast, not every subnetworkN is connected to every other
subnetwork N ′, and typically, if such a connection does ex-
ist, then it is filtered by a firewall.
From the perspective of an attacker, the firewalls filter the
connections and thus limit the attacks that can be executed
when trying to hack into a subnetworkN ′ from another sub-
network N . On the other hand, once the hacker managed to
get into a subnetwork N , access to all machines within N
is easy. Thus a natural representation of the network, from
an attack planning point of view, is that of a graph whose
vertices are subnetworks, and whose arcs are annotated with
firewalls F . We herein refer to this graph as the logical net-
work LN , and we denote its arcs with N F−→ N ′.
We formalize firewalls as sets of rules describing which
kinds of communication (e.g., ports) are disallowed. Thus
smaller sets correspond to “weaker” firewalls, and the empty
firewall blocks no communication at all.
We remark that, in our POMDP model, we do not provide
for privilege escalation, or obtaining passwords. This can
instead be modeled at the level of LN . Different privilege
levels on the same machine m can be encoded via different
copies of m. If controlling m allows the retrieval of pass-
words, then m can be connected via empty firewalls to the
machinesm′ who can be accessed by using these passwords,
more precisely to high-privilege copies of these m′.
Penetration Testing
Uncertainty in pentesting arises because it is impossible to
keep track of all the configuration details of individual ma-
chines, i.e., exactly which versions of which programs are
installed etc. However, it is safe to assume that the pentest-
ing tool knows the structure of the network, i.e., the graph
LN and the filtering done by each firewall: changes to this
are infrequent and can easily be registered.
The objective of pentesting is to gain control over certain
machines (with critical content) in the network. At any point
in time, each machine has a unique status. A controlled ma-
chine m has already been hacked into. A reached machine
m is connected to a controlled machine, i.e., either m is in a
subnetwork N one of whose machines is controlled, or m is
in a subnetwork N ′ with a LN arc N F−→ N ′ where one of
the machines in N is controlled. All other machines are not
reached. The algorithm starts with one controlled machine,
denoted here by ∗.1 We will use the following (small but
real-life) situation as a running example:
Example 1 The attacker has already hacked into a ma-
chine m′, and now wishes to attack a machine m within the
same subnetwork. The attacker knows two exploits: SA, the
“Symantec Rtvscan buffer overflow exploit”; and CAU, the
“CA Unicenter message queuing exploit”. SA targets a par-
ticular version of “Symantec Antivirus”, that usually listens
on port 2967. CAU targets a particular version of “CA Uni-
center”, that usually listens on port 6668. Both work only if
a protection mechanism called DEP (“Data Execution Pre-
vention”) is disabled.
If SA fails, then it is likely that CAU will fail as well (be-
cause DEP is enabled). The attacker is then better off trying
something else. Achieving such behavior requires the attack
plan to observe the outcomes of actions, and to react ac-
cordingly. Classical planning (which assumes perfect world
knowledge at planning time) cannot accomplish this.
Furthermore, port scans—observation actions testing
whether or not a particular port is open—should be used
only if one actually intends to execute a relevant exploit.
Here, if we start with SA, we should scan only port 2967.
We accomplish such behavior through the use of POMDPs.
By contrast, to reduce uncertainty, classical planning re-
quires a pre-process executing all possible scans. In this ex-
ample, there are only two—ports 2967 and 6668—however
in general there are many, causing significant network traffic
and waiting time.
POMDPs
POMDPs are usually defined (e.g., (Monahan 1982;
Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998)) by a tuple
〈S,A,O, T,O, r, b0〉. If the system is in state s ∈ S (the
state space), and the agent performs an action a ∈ A (the ac-
tion space), then that results in (1) a transition to a state s′ ac-
cording to the transition function T (s, a, s′) = Pr(s′|s, a),
(2) an observation o ∈ O (the observation space) according
to the observation functionO(s′, a, o) = Pr(o|s′, a) and (3)
a scalar reward r(s, a, s′). b0, the initial belief, is a proba-
bility distribution over S.
The agent must find a decision policy pi choosing, at each
step, the best action based on its past observations and ac-
tions so as to maximize its future gain, which we measure
here through the total accumulated reward. The expected
value of an optimal policy is denoted with V ∗.
1For simplicity, we will notate ∗ as a separate vertex in LN .
If ∗ is part of a subnetwork N , this means to turn N \ {∗} into a
separate vertex in LN , connected to ∗ via the empty firewall.
The agent typically reasons about the hidden state of the
system using a belief state b, a probability distribution over
S. For our experiments we use SARSOP (Kurniawati, Hsu,
and Lee 2008), a state of the art point-based algorithm, i.e.,
an algorithm approximating the value function as the upper
envelope of a set of hyperplanes, corresponding to a selec-
tion of particular belief states (referred to as “points”).
POMDP Model
A preliminary version of our POMDP model appeared at
the SecArt’11 workshop (Sarraute, Buffet, and Hoffmann
2011). The reader may refer to that paper for a more detailed
example listing complete transition and observation models
for some actions, and exemplifying the evolution of belief
states when applying these actions. In what follows, we keep
the description brief in the interest of space.
States
Several aspects of the problem—notably the network struc-
ture and the firewall filtering rules—are known and static.
POMDP variables encoding these aspects can be compiled
out in a pre-process, and are not included in our model.
The states capture the status of each machine (con-
trolled/reached/not reached). For non-controlled machines,
they also specify the software configuration (operating sys-
tem, servers, open ports, . . . ). We specify the vulnerable
programs, as well as programs that can provide information
about these (e.g., the protection mechanism “DEP” in our
running example is relevant to both exploits). The states also
indicate whether a given machine or program has crashed.
Finally, we introduce one special terminal state into the
POMDP model (of the entire network, not of individual ma-
chines). That state corresponds to giving up the attack, when
for every available action (if any) the potential benefit is not
worth the action’s cost.
Example 2 The states describe the attacked machine m.
For simplicity, we assume that the exploits here do not risk
crashing the machine (see also next sub-section). Apart
from the terminal state and the state representing that m
is controlled, the states specify which programs (“SA” or
“CAU”) are present, whether they are vulnerable, and
whether “DEP” is enabled. Each application is listening
on a different port, so a port is open iff the respective appli-
cation is present, and we do not need to model ports sepa-
rately. Thus we have a total of 20 states:
1 terminal
2 m_controlled
3 m_none
4 m_CAU
5 m_CAU_Vul
6 m_SA
7 m_SA_CAU
8 m_SA_CAU_Vul
9 m_SA_Vul
10 m_SA_Vul_CAU
11 m_SA_Vul_CAU_Vul
12 m_DEP_none
13 m_DEP_CAU
14 m_DEP_CAU_Vul
15 m_DEP_SA
16 m_DEP_SA_CAU
17 m_DEP_SA_CAU_Vul
18 m_DEP_SA_Vul
19 m_DEP_SA_Vul_CAU
20 m_DEP_SA_Vul_CAU_Vul
In short, the states for each machine m essentially are
tuples of status values for each relevant program. Global
system states then are tuples of these machines-states, with
one entry for each m ∈ M . The state space enumerates
these tuples. In other words, the state space is factored in
a natural way, by programs and machines. An obvious op-
tion is, thus, to model and solve the problem using factored
POMDPs (e.g., (Hansen and Feng 2000)). We did not try
this yet; our POMDP model generator internally enumerates
the states, and feeds the ground model to SARSOP.2
The factored nature of our problem also implies that the
state space is huge. In a realistic setting, the set C of pos-
sible configuration tuples for each machine m ∈ M is very
large, yielding an enormous state space |S| = O(|C||M |).
In practice, we will run POMDPs only on single machines,
i.e., |M | = 1.
Actions
To reach the terminal state, we need a terminate action indi-
cating that one gives up on the attack.
There are two main types of actions, scans and exploits,
which both have to be targeted at reachable machines. Scans
can be OS detection actions or port scans. In most cases,
they have no effect on the state of the target machine. Their
purpose is to gain knowledge about a machine’s configura-
tion, by an observation that typically allows to prune some
states from the belief (e.g., observing that the OS must
be some Windows XP version). Exploits make use of a
vulnerability—if present—to gain control over a machine.
The outcome of the exploit is observed by the attacker, so
a failed exploit may, like a scan, yield information about
the configuration (e.g., that a protection mechanism is likely
to be running). For a minority of exploits, a failed attempt
crashes the machine.
For all actions, the outcome is deterministic: which
observation is returned, and whether an exploit suc-
ceeds/fails/crashes, is uniquely determined by the target ma-
chine’s configuration.
Example 3 In our example, there are five possible actions:
m_exploit_SA
m_exploit_CAU
m_scan_port_2967
m_scan_port_6668
terminate
The POMDP model specifies, for each state in Example 2,
the outcome of each action. For example, m_exploit_SA suc-
ceeds if and only if SA is present and vulnerable, and DEP
is disabled. Hence, when applied to either of the states 9,
10, or 11, m_exploit_SA results in state 2, and returns the ob-
servation succeeded. Applied to any other state, m_exploit_SA
leaves the state unchanged, and the observation is failed.
The outcomes of actions also depend on what firewall (if
any) stands between the pentester and the target. If the fire-
wall filters out the relevant port, then the action is unusable:
its transition model leaves the state unchanged, and no ob-
servation is returned. For example, if a firewall F filters out
port 2967, then m_scan_port_2967 and m_exploit_SA are unus-
able through F , but can be employed as soon as a machine
behind F is under control.
2Note that this approach enables certain non-trivial optimiza-
tions: some of the states in Example 2 could be merged. If DEP is
enabled, then it does not matter whether or not CAU/SA are vul-
nerable. For brevity, we do not discuss this in detail here.
Rewards
No reward is obtained when using the terminate action or
when in the terminal state.
The instant reward of any scan/exploit action depends
on the transition it induces in the present state. Our sim-
ple model is to additively decompose the instant reward
r(s, a, s′) into r(s, a, s′) = re(s, a, s′) + rt(a) + rd(a).
Here, (i) re(s, a, s′) is the value of the attacked machine in
case the transition (s, a, s′) corresponds to a successful ex-
ploit, and is 0 for all other transitions; (ii) rt(a) is a cost that
depends on the action’s duration; and (iii) rd(a) is a cost that
reflects the risk of detection when using this action. (iii) is
orthogonal to the risk of crashing a program/machine, which
as described we model as a possible outcome of exploits.
Note that (ii) and (iii) may be correlated; however, there is
no 1-to-1 correspondence between the duration and detec-
tion risk of an exploit, so it makes sense to be able to distin-
guish these two. Finally, note that (i) results in summing up
rewards for successful exploits on different machines. That
is not a limiting assumption: one can reward breaking into
[m1 OR m2] by introducing a new virtual machine, accessi-
ble at no cost from each of m1 and m2.
Example 4 In our example, we set re = 100 in case of suc-
cess, 0 otherwise; rt = −10 for all actions; and rd = 0
(no risk of detection). We will see below what effect these
settings have on an optimal policy.
Since all actions are deterministic, there is no point in re-
peating them on the same target through the same firewall—
this will not produce new effects or bring any new infor-
mation. In particular, positive rewards cannot be received
multiple times. Thus cyclic behaviors incur infinite negative
costs. This implies that the expected reward of an optimal
policy is finite even without discounting.3
Designing the Initial Belief
Penetration testing is done at regular time intervals. The ini-
tial belief—our knowledge of the network when we start the
pentesting—depends on (a) what was known at the end of
the previous pentest, and on (b) what may have changed
since then. We assume for simplicity that knowledge (a)
is perfect, i.e., each machine m at time 0 (the last pentest)
is assigned one concrete configuration I(m). We then com-
pute the initial belief as a function b0(I, T ) where T is the
number of days elapsed since the last pentest. The uncer-
tainty in this belief arises from not knowing which software
updates were applied. We assume that the updates are made
independently on each machine (simplifying, but reasonable
given that updates are controlled by individual users).
A simple model of updates (Sarraute, Buffet, and Hoff-
mann 2011) encodes the uncertain evolution of each pro-
gram independently, in terms of a Markov chain. The states
in each chain correspond to the different versions of the pro-
gram, and the transitions model the possible program up-
dates (with estimated probabilities that these updates will be
made). The initial belief then is the distribution resulting
from this chain after T steps.
3In fact, the problem falls into the class of Stochastic Shortest
Path Problems (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis 1996).
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Figure 1: The three independent Markov chains used to
model the update mechanism in our example network.
Example 5 In our running example, the three components
in the single machine are DEP, CAU and SA. They are up-
dated via three independent Markov chains, each with two
states, as illustrated in Figure 1. The probabilities indicate
how likely the machine is to transition from one state to an-
other during one day. Say we set T = 30, and run the
Markov chains on the configuration I in which m has DEP
disabled, and both SA and CAU are vulnerable to the at-
tacker’s exploit. In the resulting initial belief b0(I, T ), DEP
is likely to be enabled; the weight of states 12–20 in Exam-
ple 2 is high in b0 (> 70%).
Here, we use this simple model as the basic building block
in a method taking into account that version x of program
A may need version y or z of program B. We assume that
programs are organized in a hierarchical manner, the oper-
ating system being at the root of a directed acyclic graph,
and a program having as its parents the programs it di-
rectly depends on. This yields a Dynamic Bayesian Net-
work, where each conditional probability distribution is de-
rived from a Markov chain Pr(Xt = x′|Xt−1 = x) fil-
tered by a compatibility function δ(X = x, parent1(X) =
x1, . . . , parentk(X) = xk), that returns 1 iff the value of
X is compatible with the parent versions, 0 otherwise. This
model of updates is reasonable, but of course still not realis-
tic; future work needs to investigate such models in detail.
We now illustrate how reasoning with the probabilities of
the initial belief results in the desired intelligent behavior.
Example 6 Say we compute the initial belief b0(I, T ) as
in Example 5. Since the weight of states 12–20 is high
in b0, if m_exploit_SA fails, then the success probability of
m_exploit_CAU is reduced to the point of not being worth the
effort anymore, and the attacker (the optimal policy) gives
up, i.e., would try a different attack not prevented by DEP.
Namely, consider Pr(CAU+|2967+), i.e., the probability of
m_exploit_CAU succeeding, after observing that port 2967 is
open. This corresponds to the weight of (A) states 8 and
11 in Example 2, within the states (B) 6–11 plus 15–20.
That weight (A/B) is about 20%. Thus the expected value
of m_exploit_CAU in this situation is about 100 ∗ 0.2 [success
reward] −10 [action cost] = 10, cf. Example 4, so the ac-
tion is worthwhile. By contrast, say that m_exploit_SA has
been tried and failed. Then (A) is reduced to state 8 only,
while (B) still contains (in particular) all the DEP states
15–20. The latter states have a lot of weight, and thus
Pr(CAU+|2967+,SA−) is only about 5%. Given this, the
expected value of m_exploit_CAU is negative, and it is better
to apply terminate instead.
4AL Decomposition Algorithm
As hinted, POMDPs do not scale to large networks (cf. the
experiments in the next section). We now present an ap-
proach using decomposition and approximation to overcome
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(a) LN as tree of components C. (b) Paths for attacking C1. (c) Attacking N3 from N1, using m first.
Figure 2: Illustration of Levels 1, 2, and 3 (from left to right) of the 4AL algorithm.
this problem, relying on POMDPs only to attack individual
machines. The approach is called 4AL since it addresses
network attack at 4 different levels of abstraction. 4AL is a
POMDP solver specialized to attack planning as addressed
here. Its input are the logical network LN and POMDP
models encoding attacks on individual machines. Its output
is a policy (an attack) for the global POMDP encoding LN ,
as well as an approximation of the value of the global value
function. We next overview the algorithm, then fill in some
technical details. To simplify the presentation, we will focus
on the approximation of the value function, and outline only
briefly how to construct the policy.
4AL Overview and Basic Properties
The four levels of 4AL are: (1) Decomposing the Network,
(2) Attacking Components, (3) Attacking Subnetworks, and
(4) Attacking Individual Machines. We outline these levels
in turn before providing technical details. Figure 2 provides
illustrations.
• Level 1: Decompose the logical network LN into a tree
of biconnected components, rooted at ∗. In reverse topo-
logical order, call Level 2 on each component; propagate
the outcomes upwards in the tree.
Every graph decomposes into a unique tree of bicon-
nected components (Hopcroft and Tarjan 1973). A bicon-
nected component is a sub-graph that remains connected
when removing any one vertex. In pentesting, intuitively
this means that there is more than one possibility (more than
one path) to attack the subnetworks within the component,
requiring to reason about the component as a whole (which
is the job of Level 2). By contrast, if removing subnetwork
X (e.g., N2 in Figure 2 (b)) makes the graph fall apart into
two separate sub-graphs (C2 vs. the rest of LN , compare
also Figure 2 (a)), then all attacks from ∗ to one of these sub-
graphs (C2 here) must first traverse X (N2 here). Thus the
overall expected value of the attack can be computed by (1)
computing the value of attacking that sub-graph (C2) alone,
and (2) adding the result as a pivoting reward to the reward
of breaking into X (N2). In other words, we “propagate the
outcomes upwards” in the tree displayed in Figure 2 (a).
It is important to note that this tree decomposition will
typically result in a huge reduction of complexity. Bicon-
nected components in LN arise only from clusters of more
than 2 subnetworks sharing a common (physical) firewall
machine. Such clusters tend to be small. In the real-world
test scenario used by Core Security and in our experiment
here, there is only one cluster, of size 3. In case there are
no clusters at all, LN is a tree and 4AL Level 2 trivializes
completely.
• Level 2: Given component C, consider, for each re-
warded subnetwork N ∈ C, all paths P in C that reach
N . Backwards along each P , call Level 3 on each sub-
network and associated firewall. Choose the best path for
each N . Aggregate these path values over all N , by sum-
ming up but disregarding rewards that were already ac-
counted for by a previous path in the sum.
In case a biconnected component C contains more than
one subnetwork, to obtain the best attack on C, in general
we have no choice but to encode the entire component as a
POMDP. Since that is not feasible, Level 2 considers indi-
vidual “attack paths” within C. Any single path P is equiv-
alent to a sequence of attacks on individual subnetworks;
these attacks are evaluated using Level 3. We consider the
rewarded vertices N in separation, enumerating the attack
paths and choosing a best one. The values of the best paths
are aggregated over all N in a conservative (pessimistic)
manner, by accounting for each reward at most once. A
strict under-estimation occurs in case the best paths for some
rewarded vertices are not disjoint: then these attacks share
some of their cost, so a combined attack has a higher ex-
pected reward than the sum of independent attacks.
In Figure 2 (b),N2 andN3 have a pivoting reward because
they allow to reach the components C2 and C3 respectively.
If the best paths for both N2 and N3 go via N1 (because the
firewall F ∗3 is very strict), then these paths are not disjoint,
duplicating the effort for breaking into N1.
Obviously, enumerating attack paths withinC is exponen-
tial in the size of C. This is the only point in 4AL—apart of
course from calls to the POMDP solver—that has worst-case
exponential runtime. In practice, biconnected components
are typically small, cf. the above.
• Level 3: Given a subnetwork N and a firewall F through
which to attack N , for each machine m ∈ N approxi-
mate the reward obtained when attackingm first. For this,
Algorithm 1: Level 1 (Decomposing the Network)
Input: LN : Logical Network.
Output: Approximation V of expected value V ∗ of
attacking LN from controlled machine ∗.
/* Decompose LN into tree DLN of biconnected
components, rooted at ∗; see text for
‘‘clean-up’’. */
1 DLN ←HopcroftTarjan(LN);
2 Set tree root to ∗ and clean-up LN and DLN ;
3 C1, . . . , Ck ← a topological ordering of DLN ;
4 Intitialize pivoting reward pr(N) for all N ∈ LN to 0;
5 for i = k, ..., 1 do
/* Call Level 2 to attack each component. */
6 V (Ci)←Level2(Ci, pr);
/* Propagate expected reward. */
7 N ← the parent of Ci in LN ;
8 pr(N)← pr(N) + V (Ci);
9 return pr(∗)
Algorithm 2: Level 2 (Attacking Components)
Input: Biconnected component C, reward function pr.
Output: Approximation V of expected value V ∗ of
attacking C, given its parent is controlled and
its pivoting rewards are pr.
1 R← 0;
/* Account for each rewarded vertex N. */
2 while ∃N ∈ C s.t. r(N) > 0 or pr(N) > 0 do
3 P ← 〈〉; R(P )← 0; P (N)← P ;
/* Maximize over all simple paths (no repeated
vertices) from an entry vertex to N. */
4 foreach simple path P of the form
F0−→ N1 F1−→ N2 . . . Fk−1−−−→ Nk = N where
N1, . . . , Nk ∈ C and N1 ∈ C∗ do
/* Propagate rewards along P, calling Level
3 for attack on each subnetwork. */
5 R(P )← 0;
6 for i = k, ..., 1 do
7 R(P )← Level3(Ni, Fi−1, pr(Ni), R(P ));
8 P (N)← arg max(R(P (N)), R(P ));
9 R← R+R(P (N));
10 r(Ni), pr(Ni)← 0 for all vertices Ni on P (N);
11 return R
Algorithm 3: Level 3 (Attacking Subnetworks)
Input: Firewall F , subnetwork N , rewards pR, pathR.
Output: Approximation V of expected value V ∗ of
attacking N through F , given F is reached,
N ’s pivoting reward is pR, and the path
reward behind N is pathR.
1 R← 0;
/* Maximize over reward obtained when hacking first
into a particular machine m ∈ N. */
2 foreachm ∈ N do
3 R(m)← r(m);
/* After breaking m, we can pivot behind N,
and reach all m 6= m′ ∈ N without F. */
4 R(m)← R(m) + pR+ pathR;
5 foreachm 6= m′ ∈ N do
6 R(m)← R(m)+Level4(m′, ∅, r(m′));
7 R← max(R, Level4(m,F,R(m)));
8 return R
Algorithm 4: Level 4 (Attacking Individual Machines)
Input: Firewall F , machine m, reward R.
Output: Approximation V of expected value V ∗ of
attacking m through F , given m is reached
and the current reward of breaking it is R.
1 if (m,F,R) is cached then
2 return V (m,F,R)
3 M ←createPOMDP(m,F,R);
4 V ←solvePOMDP(M);
5 Cache (m,F,R) with V ;
6 return V
Figure 3: 4AL algorithm, pseudo-code.
modify m’s reward to take into account that, after break-
ing m, we are behind F : call Level 4 to obtain the values
of all m′ 6= m with an empty firewall; then add these val-
ues, plus any pivoting reward, to the reward of m and call
Level 4 on this modifiedmwith firewall F . Maximize the
resulting value over all m ∈ N .
Consider Figure 2 (c). When attackingN (here,N3) from
some machine behind the firewall F (here, F 13 ), we have to
choose which machine inside N to attack. Given we com-
mit to one such choice m, the attack problem becomes that
of breaking into m and afterwards exploiting the direct con-
nection to any m 6= m′ ∈ N , and any descendant network
(here, C3) we can now pivot to. As described, that can be
dealt with by combining attacks on individual machines with
modified rewards. (The pivoting reward for descendant net-
works is computed beforehand by Levels 1 and 2.)
Like Level 2, Level 3 makes a conservative approxima-
tion. It fixes a choice of which m ∈ N to attack. By con-
trast, the best strategy may be to switch between different
m ∈ N depending on the success of the attack so far. For
example, if one exploit is very likely to succeed, then it may
pay off to try this on all m first, before trying anything else.
• Level 4: Given a machine m and a firewall F , model
the single-machine attack planning problem as a POMDP,
and run an off-the-shelf POMDP solver. Cache known
results to avoid duplicate effort.
This last step should be self-explanatory. The POMDP
model is created as described earlier. Note that Level 3 may,
during the execution of 4AL, call the same machine with the
same firewall more than once. For example, in Figure 2 (c),
when we switch to attacking m′1 instead of m, the call of
Level 4 with m′k and an empty firewall is repeated.
Summing up, 4AL has low-order polynomial runtime ex-
cept for the enumeration of paths within biconnected com-
ponents (Level 2), and solving single-machine POMDPs
(Level 4). The decomposition at Level 1 incurs no informa-
tion loss. Levels 2 and 3 make conservative approximations,
so, if the POMDP solutions are conservative (e.g., optimal),
then the overall outcome of 4AL is conservative as well.
Technicalities
To provide a more detailed understanding of 4AL, we now
discuss pseudo-code for the algorithm, provided in Figure 3.
Consider first Algorithm 1. It should be clear how the over-
all structure of the algorithm corresponds to our previous
discussion. It calls the linear-time algorithm by Hopcroft
and Tarjan (1973) (hereafter, HT) to find the decomposition.
The loop i = k, . . . , 1 processes the components in reverse
topological order. The pivoting reward function pr encodes
the propagation of rewards upwards in the tree; this should
be self-explanatory apart for the expression “the parent” of
Ci in LN . The latter relies on the fact that, after “clean-up”
(line 2), each component has exactly one such parent.
To explain the clean-up, note first that HT works on undi-
rected graphs; when applying it, we ignore the direction of
the arcs in LN . The outcome is an undirected tree of bicon-
nected components, where the cut vertices—those vertices
removing which makes the graph break apart—are shared
between several components. In Figure 2 (b), e.g., N2 prior
to the clean-up belongs to both, C1 and C2. The clean-up
sets the root of the tree to ∗, and assigns each cut-vertex to
the component closest to ∗ (e.g., N2 is assigned to C1); ∗ it-
self is turned into a separate component. Re-introducing the
direction of arcs in LN , we then prune vertices not reach-
able from ∗. Next, we remove arcs that cannot participate in
any non-redundant attack path starting in ∗. Since moving
towards ∗ in the decomposition tree necessarily leads any at-
tack back to a vertex it has visited (broken into) already, after
such removal the arcs between components form a directed
tree as in Figure 2 (a). Each non-root component Ci (e.g.,
C3) has exactly one parent component C in the cleaned-up
tree (e.g., C1). The respective subnetwork N ∈ C (e.g., N3)
is a cut vertex in LN . Thus, as claimed above, N is the only
vertex, in LN , that connects into Ci.
Obviously, all attacks on Ci must pass through its parent
N . Further, the vertices and arcs removed by clean-up can-
not be part of an optimal attack. Thus Level 1 is loss-free. To
state this—and the other properties of 4AL—formally, we
need some notations. We will use V ∗ to denote the real (op-
timal) expected value of an attack, and V to denote the 4AL
approximation. The attacked object is given as the argument.
For example, V ∗(LN) is the expected value of attacking
LN ; V (C, pr) is the outcome of running 4AL Level 2 on
component C and pivoting reward function pr.
Proposition 1 Let LN be a logical network. Say that, for
all calls to 4AL Level 2 made by 4AL Level 1 when run on
LN , we have V (C, pr) = V ∗(C, pr). Then V (LN) =
V ∗(LN). If V (C, pr) ≤ V ∗(C, pr) for all calls to 4AL
Level 2, then V (LN) ≤ V ∗(LN).
Consider now Algorithm 2. Our previous description was
imprecise in omitting the additional algorithm argument pr.
This integrates with the algorithm by being passed on, for
every subnetwork on the paths we consider (line 7), to Al-
gorithm 3 which adds it to the reward obtained for hacking
into that subnetwork (Algorithm 3 line 4).
R aggregates the values (lines 1, 9), over all rewarded sub-
networks N . This aggregation is made conservative by re-
moving all rewards—pivoting rewards as well as the own
rewards of the individual machines involved—that have al-
ready been accounted for (line 10). Regarding the individual
machines, Algorithm 2 uses the shorthands (a) r(N) > 0
(line 2) and (b) r(N)← 0 (line 10); (a) means that there ex-
ists m ∈ N so that r(m) > 0; (b) means that r(m)← 0 for
all m ∈ N . Regarding pivoting rewards, note that line 10 of
Algorithm 2 modifies the function pr maintained by Algo-
rithm 1. This does not lead to conflicts because, at the time
when Algorithm 1 calls Algorithm 2 on component C, all
descendants of C in LN have already been processed, and
thus in particular Algorithm 1 will make no further updates
to the value of pr(N), for any N ∈ C.
By C∗ (line 4) we denote the set {N ∈ C | ∃N ′ ∈
LN,N ′ 6∈ C : (N ′, N) ∈ LN} of subnetworks that serve
as an entry into C (e.g., N1 and N3 for C1 in Figure 2 (b)).
Note in line 4 that the path P starts with a firewall F0. To
understand this, consider the situation addressed. The algo-
rithm assumes that the parent N of C (∗, for component C1
in Figure 2 (b)) is under control. But then, to break into C,
we still need to traverse an arc from N into C. F0 is the
firewall on the arc chosen by P (F ∗1 or F
∗
3 in Figure 2 (b)).
The calls to Level 3 (line 7) comprise the network Ni to
be hacked into, the firewall Fi−1 that must be traversed for
doing so, the pivoting reward of Ni, as well as the ongoing
path reward R(P ) which gets propagated backwards along
the path. Clearly, this is equivalent to the sequence of attacks
required to execute P , and harvesting all pivoting rewards
associated with such an attack. Thus, with the conservative-
ness of the aggregation across the subnetworks N , we get:
Proposition 2 Let C be a biconnected component, and let
pr be a pivoting reward function. Say that, for all calls to
4AL Level 3 made by 4AL Level 2 when run on (C, pr), we
have V (F,N, pR, pathR) ≤ V ∗(F,N, pR, pathR). Then
V (C, pr) ≤ V ∗(C, pr).
Algorithms 3 and 4 should be self-explanatory, given our
previous discussion. Just note that the pivoting reward pR is
represented by the arc from m to C3 in Figure 2 (c), which
is accounted for by simply adding it to the value of m (Al-
gorithm 3 line 4). The path reward pathR (not illustrated in
Figure 2 (c)) is also added to the value of m (Algorithm 3
line 4). Max’ing over attacks on the individual machines m
is, obviously, a conservative approximation because attack
strategies are free to choose m. Thus:
Proposition 3 Let F be a firewall, let N be a subnet-
work, let pR be a pivoting reward, and let pathR be a
path reward. Say that, for all calls to 4AL Level 4 made
by 4AL Level 3 when run on (F,N, pR, pathR), we have
V (F,m,R) ≤ V ∗(F,m,R). Then V (F,N, pR, pathR) ≤
V ∗(F,N, pR, pathR).
Policy Construction
At Level 1, the global policy is constructed from the Level 2
policies simply by following the tree decomposition: start-
ing at the tree root, we execute the Level 2 policies for all
reached components (in any order); once a hack into a com-
ponent succeeds, the respective children components be-
come reached. At Level 2, i.e., within a bi-connected com-
ponent C, the policy corresponds to the set of paths P con-
sidered by Algorithm 2. Each P is processed in turn. For
each node N in P (until failure to enter that subnetwork),
we call the corresponding Level 3 policy.
At Level 3, i.e., considering a single subnetwork N , our
policy simply attacks the machine m ∈ N that yielded the
maximum in Algorithm 3. The policy first attacksm through
the firewall, using the respective Level 4 policy. In case the
attack succeeds, the policy attacks the remaining machines
m′ ∈ N in any order (i.e., for each m′, we perform the
associated Level 4 policy until termination). At Level 4, the
policy is the POMDP policy returned by our POMDP solver.
Experiments
We evaluated 4AL against the “global” POMDP model, en-
coding the entire attack problem into a single POMDP. The
experiments are run on a machine with an Intel Core2 Duo
CPU at 2.2 GHz and 3 GB of RAM. The 4AL algorithm is
implemented in Python. To solve and evaluate the POMDPs
generated by Level 4, we use the APPL toolkit.4
Test Scenario
Our test scenario is based on the network structure shown in
Figure 5. The attack begins from the Internet (∗ is the cloud
in the top left corner). The network consists of three areas—
Exposed, Sensitive, User—separated by firewalls. Inter-
nally, each of Exposed and Sensitive is fully connected (i.e.,
these areas are subnetworks), whereas User consists of a tree
of subnetworks separated by empty firewalls. Only two ma-
chines are rewarded, one in Sensitive (reward 9000) and one
in a leaf subnetwork of User (reward 5000). The cost of port
scans and exploits is 10, the cost of OS detection is 50. We
allow to scale the number of machines |M | by distributing,
of every 40 machines, the first one to Exposed, the second
one to Sensitive, and the remaining 38 to User. The exploits
are taken from Core Security’s database. The number of ex-
ploits |E| is scaled by distributing these over 13 templates,
and assigning to each machinem one such template as I(m)
(the known configuration at the time of the last pentest). The
initial belief b0(I, T ), where T is the time elapsed since the
last pentest, is then generated as outlined.
The fixed parameters here (rewards, action costs, distribu-
tion of machines over areas, number of templates) are esti-
mated based on practical experiences at Core Security. The
network structure and exploits are realistic, and are used for
industrial testing in that company. The main weakness of
the scenario lies in the approximation of software updates
underlying b0(I, T ). Altogether, the scenario is still sim-
plified, but is natural and does approach the complexity of
real-world penetration testing.
4APPL 0.93 at http://bigbird.comp.nus.edu.sg/pmwiki/farm/appl/
Figure 5: Network structure in our test suite.
For lack of space, in what follows we scale only |M | and
|E|, fixing |T | = 50. The latter is realistic but challeng-
ing: pentesting is typically performed about once a month;
smaller T are easier to solve as there is less uncertainty.
Approximation Loss
Figure 4 (a) shows the relative loss of quality when run-
ning 4AL instead of a global POMDP solution, for val-
ues of |E| and |M | where the latter is feasible. We show
quality(global -POMDP) − quality(4AL) in percent of
quality(global -POMDP). Policy quality here is estimated
by running 2000 simulations. That measurement incurs a
variance, which is almost stronger than the very small qual-
ity advantage of the global POMDP solution. The maxi-
mal loss for any combination of |E| and |M | is 14.1% (at
|E| = 7, |M | = 6), the average loss over all combinations
is 1.96%. The average loss grows monotonically over |M |,
from −1.14% for |M | = 1 to 4.37% for |M | = 6. Over
|E|, the behavior is less regular; the maximum average loss,
5.4%, is obtained when fixing |E| = 5.
Scaling Up
Figure 4 (b) shows the runtime of 4AL when scaling up to
much larger values of |E| and |M |. The scaling behavior
over |M | clearly reflects the fact that 4AL is polynomial in
that parameter, except for the size of biconnected compo-
nents (which is 3 here). Scaling E yields more challeng-
ing single-machine POMDPs, resulting in a sometimes steep
growth of runtime. However, even with |M | and |E| both
around 100, which is a realistic size in practice, the runtime
is always below 37 seconds.
Conclusion
We have devised a POMDP model of penetration testing that
allows to naturally represent many of the features of this ap-
plication, in particular incomplete knowledge about the net-
work configuration, as well as dependencies between differ-
ent attack possibilities, and firewalls. Unlike any previous
methods, the approach is able to intelligently mix scans with
exploits. While this accurate solution does not scale, large
networks can be tackled by a decomposition algorithm. Our
present empirical results suggest that this is accomplished at
a small loss in quality relative to a global POMDP solution.
(a) Attack quality comparison. (b) Runtime of 4AL.
Figure 4: Empirical results for 4AL compared to a global POMDP model.
An important open question is to what extent our POMDP
+ decomposition approach is more cost-effective than the
classical planning solution currently employed by Core Se-
curity. Our next step will be to answer this question exper-
imentally, comparing the attack quality of 4AL against that
of the policy that runs extensive scans and then attaches FF’s
plan for the most probable configuration.
4AL is a domain-specific algorithm and, as such, does not
contribute to the solution of POMDPs in general. At a high
level of abstraction, its idea can be understood as impos-
ing a template on the policy constructed, thus restricting the
space of policies explored (and employing special-purpose
algorithms within each part of the template). In this, the
approach is somewhat similar to known POMDP decompo-
sition approaches (e.g., (Pineau, Gordon, and Thrun 2003;
Mu¨ller and Biundo 2011)). It remains to be seen whether
this connection can turn out fruitful for either future work
on attack planning, or POMDP solving more generally.
The main directions for future work are to devise more ac-
curate models of software updates (hence obtaining more re-
alistic designs of the initial belief); to tailor POMDP solvers
to this particular kind of problem, which has certain special
features, in particular the absence of non-deterministic ac-
tions and that some of the uncertain parts of the state (e.g.
the operating systems) are static; and to drive the industrial
application of this technology. We hope that these will in-
spire other researchers as well.
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